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ABSTRACT
Naval aviation is on the brink of taking advantage
of a 12 year old capability.

Naval commercial derivative

aircraft have had the ability to navigate in instrument
meteorological conditions using global positioning
technology for nearly as long as civil commercial-for-hire
aircraft.

However, tactical naval aircraft, like the E-2C

Hawkeye, are now only beginning to obtain and install the
necessary technology to meet federal aviation regulations
for satellite based area navigation.
Worldwide airspace controlling agencies have mandated
the use of navigation equipment that meets highly specific
performance standards prior to entry in required navigation
performance airspace.

Aircraft not compliant with these

standards are denied flight clearance or experience
clearance delays.

The Department of Defense has issued

policy guidance that allows military aviation organizations
to self-certify satellite based navigation technologies to
meet required navigation performance standards.
In many ways, military navigation technologies far
exceed the performance requirements for civil and
international airspace use.

These technologies, however,

are highly specific in their mission orientation and must
demonstrate their compatibility with civil aviation
standards.
This study focused on the source and the specifics of
navigation performance requirements.

Domestic and

international regulations and policies were reviewed as
they pertain to civil aviation, and then applied to
military aviation.

Critical technical standards documents
vi

were reviewed to determine the best strategy for complying
with civil and international regulations.

Lessons learned

from previous E-2C navigation system evaluations were also
reviewed and incorporated within this compliance strategy.
Compliance and self-certification responsibilities belong
to aircraft specific program managers within the Navy’s
acquisition organization.
Sophisticated navigation systems incorporating
satellite positioning technology require a tailored
approach toward compliance demonstration.

Military

receivers with precise positioning capability satisfy many
of the required availability, accuracy and containment
standards.

To satisfy civil requirements, correctly keyed,

military navigation systems may be evaluated according to
standards typically applied to the most highly augmented
standard civil systems.

This thesis contains a

comprehensive list of compliance items selected for their
applicability to the E-2C Hawkeye mission.
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CHAPTER 1:

EVOLVING AVIATION

Introduction
Despite the lengthy and considerable negative impact
to the commercial airline industry following the tragic
terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, the skies are
becoming more crowded.

Figure 1 is an illustration of the

increase in density of both airplanes and electromagnetic
emissions in the radio frequency (RF) spectrum over
time[2].

The 2006 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)

Aerospace Forecast states that “the number of domestic
commercial aircraft is forecast to grow from 7,836 in 2005
to 10,677 in 2017, an average annual growth rate of 2.6

Past

Present

Future

...More Signals in the Same Radio Spectrum...

Figure 1
Illustration of Increase in Air Traffic
and Radio Frequency Congestion
Source: http://pma209.navair.navy.mil/teams/navigation/cnsatm/challenges.asp
30 Nov 2006
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percent or 237 aircraft annually”[3].

Total enplanements

are forecast to increase by 68 percent by 2020[4].
Technologies have been developed to accommodate the
increase in aircraft and signal density.

These

technologies must be integrated in Navy aircraft whose
capabilities must conform to global requirements, which are
increasing as available airspace continues to shrink.
The airwaves are also becoming more congested with RF
signals.

The aerospace industry must compete with booming

industries in technologies such as cellular phones and wifi.

What was once an allocated and assigned “spectrum”,

has become a dynamic multifaceted commodity.

Ownership of

a piece of the spectrum has given way to spread-spectrum
technology in which spectrum-sharing and dynamically
allocated frequency assignments have become the norm.

The

sophisticated parceling of RF signals requires a
sophisticated response for aviation applications.
Global Positioning Systems (GPS) have demonstrated
reliable and consistent receipt of signals use in
instrument meteorological conditions (IMC).

IMC is a

condition in which a pilot of an aircraft does not have
external visual reference to the earth’s horizon or the
airspace around him.

Military applications require
2

reliable and consistent receipt while in foreign, specially
tailored or special use airspace.

Accurate and reliable

navigational systems allow for safe operation of multiple
aircraft within a given airspace, without visual contact
between them or the ground.

It also help keeps aircraft

within a tightly bound region.
A Global Approach to Crowded Skies
To address such a complex and dynamic problem, the FAA
and the International Civil Aerospace Organization (ICAO)
recognized the need to draw upon the expertise of multiple
sources within the aerospace industry to recommend viable
and affordable solutions.

Teamed with the RTCA, formerly

the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics,
recommendations were outlined to develop a performancebased global air traffic management (GATM) system.

RTCA is

a not-for-profit corporation made up of a widely varied
group of avionics and aerospace-industry partners.

It was

founded to advance the art of aviation and aviation
electronic systems for public benefit.

It serves as a

Federal Advisory Committee to develop consensus-based
recommendations concerning contemporary aviation issues[5].
The FAA relies heavily on RTCA recommendations in all of
its standard technical requirements.
3

A proposed

performance-based system is composed of measurable safety
and security parameters.

The ultimate goal is to achieve a

verifiable air traffic capacity and navigation performance
efficiency, the foundations of a performance-based
navigation system.
The underpinning of GATM is the concept of a Global
Navigation Satellite System (GNSS).

A GNSS provides

worldwide positioning and time information in all weather
and to an unlimited number of users.

It is composed of

orbiting satellite constellations, earth-based receivers,
and system integrity monitoring stations.

GNSS is the

foundational solution to accurate and reliable global
positioning, navigation and timing (PNT).
Two satellite systems have obtained certification from
the International Frequency Registration Board (IFRB):
NAVSTAR GPS, developed by the United States (US), and
Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS),
currently operated by Russia[6].

Also, the European Union

and European Space Agency have announced plans to launch a
space-based PNT system called Galileo.
The US NAVSTAR system consists of three major
elements, referred to as segments: the space segment, the
control segment and the user segment.
4

The space segment is

Figure 2

GPS Constellation
Source: National Spaced Based PNT, Executive Committee Website

currently a constellation of 30 satellites, depicted in
figure 2.

They are grouped in 6 orbital planes at near-

stationary orbit 11,000 miles above the earth.

These

satellites transmit complex signals to a receiving system,
the “user segment”.

The receiving system performs

computations to determine the receiver’s position relative
to an accepted, world-wide coordinate system, currently the
World Geodetic System 1984.

The user segment consists of

antennas, receivers and signal processors to provide
position, velocity, and precise timing for a particular
user’s applications.

Finally, the control element consists

of monitoring stations, ground antennas, a master control
station and a backup master control station to sample and
evaluate the health of each satellite[7].
5

From the beginning, NAVSTAR was designed for dual use.
US government agencies have access to the most accurate
service, known as Precise Positioning Service (PPS), while
the general public may receive the potentially less
accurate Standard Positioning Service (SPS).

The

difference in the services can be errors intentionally
introduced through a process called Selective Availability
(SA).

Intentional degradation of the SPS was discontinued

on May 1, 2000 by presidential order[8].
Since the discontinuation of selective availability, highly accurate GPS signals have been available to
the entire general public.

Today, exceptionally capable

GPS receivers are available at a reasonable cost.

These

affordable, highly accurate navigation systems have
accuracies of a few feet and are available for automobile,
marine and aviation applications.
Over the past 13 years, GPS has matured into a robust
critical aid to navigation as it was envisioned in the
1960s.

Today, most IMC certified aircraft include at least

one GPS receiver.

Advanced navigation systems integrate

one or more receiver into a flight management system for
primary navigation.

6

The most common aviation use of GPS is for area
navigation or RNAV.

RNAV is airspace navigation in which

the pilot of an aircraft may choose any course within a
network of navigation beacons or waypoints.

RNAV is

possible with equipment that calculates position relative
to ground-based beacons or GPS satellites.

Using RNAV

methods, an aircraft is not limited to navigating directly
to and from beacons or waypoints.

Instead the aircraft can

fly an off-set course or even a course defined by user
generated waypoints.

This conserves flight distance,

reduces congestion, and permits instrument flight plans
into airports without beacons.

The concept of RNAV was

developed in the 1960s and has continued in popularity
because of its efficiency.

Performance enhancements

throughout global airspace systems directly target the
additional benefits of improving RNAV.
Despite the quickly evolving capabilities of GPS
systems, the concepts of navigation integrity and
containment are still in the deployment phase.

Most naval

tactical aircraft do not have compatible equipment that
meets the requirements of a performance-based system.

7

Performance-based Systems
A performance-based air traffic management system
centers on the desire for reliable and consistent
navigational solutions.

The focus shifts from specific

equipment type to equipment independent capability.
Aircraft, regardless of type of equipment installed, should
have the capability to reliably remain within a specified
volume of airspace for a majority of the time.
For civil aircraft equipment in the US, the minimum
navigation performance-based standards can be found in FAA
Technical Standard Orders (TSO).

A TSO is often a list of

minimum performance standards issued by the FAA for
specific civil aviation materials, parts, processes, and
appliances.

For international civil aviation, ICAO issues

standards and recommended practices (SARP).
The concept of required navigation performance (RNP)
applies to the airspace and the systems designed to operate
within a performance-based system.

The airspace or

equipment is given a value based on the performance
accuracy or capability required to fly within a specific
airspace.

Aircraft operation within or access to a defined

airspace may be limited by a lack of performance
capability.
8

In order for a performance-based navigation system to
demonstrate performance capability, the minimum operational
performance standards (MOPS) must be defined.

The FAA has

relied on RTCA for gathering input from members of the
aviation industry to recommend MOPS for various systems.
The MOPS for airborne supplemental navigation equipment
using GPS are located in RTCA document 208 (DO-208).

TSO-

C129a, which is the TSO for airborne supplemental use of
GPS, incorporates the MOPS listed in DO-208.

Standards for

receivers with ground station based signal augmentation can
be found in RTCA document 229C, Minimum Operational
Performance Standards for Global Positioning System/Wide
Area Augmentation System Airborne Equipment.
Military combat and combat support aircraft have PNT
capabilities designed to operate in combat and otherwise
stressed environments where civil PNT services are likely
to be jammed or severely limited.

As a result, current

military PNT systems exceed the RNP requirement for
navigational accuracy.

However, these systems do not

conform to the RNP requirements designed for civil
operations such as commercial air carriers.

9

Components of a Performance-based System
The critical concepts intrinsic to RNP systems are
availability, accuracy, and containment [9].

Containment

refers to a combination of system integrity and continuity.
Most navigation systems in use in naval aviation today lack
a suitable level of assurance in availability, containment
integrity and continuity.

Each concept must be precisely

understood to define appropriate requirements for future
PNT solutions.
A navigation system’s availability addresses the need
for assurance of safe operation within unpredictable
environments, of which Naval Aviators often find
themselves.

Aviators must have confidence in the PNT

system’s capability to reliably perform its required
function with every initiation of an intended operation.
Regardless of whether the changes in the environment are
natural or man-made, the system has to be available when
needed.
Containment integrity is the idea that the region
around an aircraft’s desired path can be defined, and that
the probability that the aircraft does not remain in that
region can be bounded [9].

A depiction of lateral cross-

track containment parameters is shown in figure 3. This
10

RNP RNAV Navigation (Example RNP 2)
Left Cross-Track Containment Limit

4 nm

2 X RNP Value

2 nm

RNP Value

DESIRED PATH
ACTUAL PATH

95%

RNP Value

2 X RNP Value

Right Cross-Track Containment Limit

Figure 3
Illustration of Lateral Cross-Track Containment Parameters
Source:

http://pma209.navair.navy.mil/teams/navigation/cnsatm/rnp_rnav.asp
30 Nov 2006

illustration depicts a RNP 2 containment region.

An

aircraft would be required to remain within 2 nautical
miles of the desired path, 95 percent of the total flight
time along that path.

The probability that the total

system error would exceed the specified cross track
containment limit, 4 nm in the above case, without
annunciation must be less than 10-5 per flight hour [9].
Containment continuity is based on the capability of
the aircraft’s navigation system to self-monitor and
evaluate the validity of its own navigation solution.
Errors in the navigation solution are detected by an
algorithm.

The result of which must be a timely warning

sent to the operator indicating that the system is not
11

useable for navigation.

Two common methods of monitoring

the “goodness” of GPS navigation solutions are: GPS
Integrity Channel (GIC) and Receiver Autonomous Integrity
Monitoring (RAIM).
GIC is a ground-based monitoring system.

Ground

stations monitor the signals from all satellites in view.
The ground station’s positions are known precisely and
easily validate position calculations from satellites.
This has the distinct advantage over a self-contained
monitoring systems, in that satellite redundancy is not
required to detect pseudorange errors or other satellite
failures.

Once detected, the ground stations transmit the

pseudorange errors or go-no-go signals to the user [10].
RAIM, as its name states, is self-contained and
autonomous.

Traditional RAIM uses five satellites to

detect a fault in its position solution.

Reception of six

satellites is required for the GPS receiver to detect a
fault in one satellite and exclude it from its position
solution.

A RAIM equipped GPS receiver can also determine

if sufficient satellite coverage will be available at a
specific time, allowing the operator to select and plan an
approach before reaching the terminal area environment.
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The overall ability of a system, as a whole, to
perform its intended function is the concept of continuity.
As it applies to an aircraft’s capability of remaining
within a specified volume of space, containment continuity
is the probability that the navigational system will
provide the information required to continuously remain
within a specified volume of airspace.
As airspace becomes more congested and technology
solutions increase, safety of flight considerations will
require all participants to meet a minimum standard of
navigation capability.

The individual military services

assume the burden of ensuring compliance with civil
requirements in all aircraft.

Countries implementing

specific navigation performance mandates may deny airspace
entry to non-compliant aircraft.
to the E-2C Hawkeye.
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This will certainly apply

CHAPTER 2:

NAVAL AVIATION EVOLUTION

The E-2C Hawkeye
The E-2C Hawkeye was designed as an airborne early
warning, combat command and control aircraft.

A complete

description is located in the E-2C NATOPS Flight Manual
[11].

A profile of the aircraft is shown in figure 4. The

Hawkeye was built by Grumman Aerospace Corporation as a
high-wing, twin engine, turboprop.

The aircraft has

several unmistakably identifiable features, one of which is
the 24-foot diameter, combination radar rotodome antenna.
It also has four vertical tails on the empennage and twin
8-bladed propellers.

Figure 4
E-2C Hawkeye
Source: http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/e-2.htm, 30 Nov 2006
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The two unique, eight-bladed Hamilton Sundstrand
propellers are attached to two Rolls-Royce T56-A-427
engines rated at 5,100 indicated shaft horsepower (ISHP).
The combination of each engine makes the E-2C one of the
most powerful, twin-engine turboprops in the world.
The mission of the Hawkeye is to provide airborne
early warning, detection and combat command and control in
the context of complete battle space management.

Designed

to be launched from the flight deck of an aircraft carrier,
the E-2 is suited for missions around the globe.
E-2C Navigation Systems
The E-2C rolled off the assembly line in the early
1970s with a navigation system that, at the time, was topof-the-line. Those system components are listed in table 1.
[12]
Table 1: Initial E-2C Navigation Components

System
Designation
AN/ASN-92(V)
CP-10851AS
AN/APN-l53(V
AN/ASN-50
AN/ARN-52(V)
AN/ARA-50

Long Name
Carrier Inertial Navigation
System
Air Data Computer
Doppler Radar Navigation Set
Heading & Attitude Reference
System
Tactical Air Navigation System
UHF Automatic Direction Finder

15

Short
Name
CAINS
ADC
HARS
TACAN
UHF ADF

The original inertial navigation system, CAINS, is
still in use in some E-2Cs operating today.

CAINS,

although capable, is highly susceptible to position drift
and tumbling gyros following catapult launches.
has a poor user interface.

It also

The combination of these

shortfalls illustrates the lack of RNP availability
assurance.
Since 1997, significant changes have been made to the
aircraft’s navigation system.
still underway today.

Some of those changes are

The Doppler navigation system was

the first system to be removed.

The air data computer has

been updated to a standard central air data computer by
incorporating more solid state components.
receiver was upgraded to the AN/ARN-118(v).

The TACAN
The

integration of these more reliable systems has been a vast
improvement.

However, the availability of newer, more

capable systems has far out-paced the E-2’s system upgrade
rate.
Current E-2C Navigation Systems
With the exception of a recent commercial, off-theshelf navigation system, the E-2’s navigation system does
not meet most navigation performance standards.

16

The

Table 2: Current E-2C Navigation Components

System
Designation
AN/ARN-151(V)
GNS-530
AN/ASN-139
AN/ARN-118(V)
CPU 140/A

Short
Name
GPS
NA
CAINS II

Long Name

GPS Receiver
Garmin GNS-530
Strap down Ring Laser Gyro
Carrier Inertial Navigation
System
Tactical Air Navigation System TACAN
Standard Central Air Data
SCADC
Computer

Hawkeye’s current navigation components are listed in
table 2.
The current integrated GPS, the AN/ARN-151(V), was a
vast improvement to the navigation suite.

The ARN-151(V)

has a five channel receiver, four of which are used at any
one time to calculate position for use in determining
navigation solutions.

The fifth channel tracks one extra

satellite for use in the event of a satellite drop-out in
one of the first four channels.

The system’s functions are

controlled through one of two Multi-function Control
Display Units (MFCDU).
The ARN-151(V) is a PPS receiver which achieves
position accuracies within a few meters.

However, the ARN-

151 is susceptible to frequent satellite reception dropouts, resulting in degraded reliability.

17

The drop-outs are

usually due to aircraft attitude or to antenna masking by
part of the aircraft’s structure.

The aircraft’s position

solution can be aided by the inertial navigation system.
Aside from the GPS receiver and MFCDU, the aircraft’s
navigation capability also includes two strapped-down ring
laser gyroscopes and a TACAN receiver.

Both components

should remain as part of the aircraft’s standard
configuration for the foreseeable future.
A recent upgrade to the E-2 navigation system was the
Garmin GNS-530.

The GNS-530 is a commercial off-the-shelf

GPS system that has FAA TSO-C129a, class A1 certification
for area navigation to 0.3 nautical miles (nm).
Additionally, the GNS-530 offers very high frequency (VHF),
omni-directional radio range (VOR) navigation, frequency
modulation (FM) immune instrument landing system (ILS)
precision approach capability, a color moving map display,
and an national air space (NAS) waypoint and instrument
approach procedures navigation database.

Finally, the GNS-

530 has a 10-watt embedded VHF radio that is capable of
both 8.33 kHz and 25 kHz channel spacing.
The Navy completed testing of the GNS-530 in January
2004 with a total cost of approximately $360,000.

The test

program consisted of 11 flights, five days of lab testing
18

and 23 days of ground testing.

A majority of the tests

focused on electromagnetic compatibility, human machine
interface (HMI) characteristics and shipboard
compatibility.
The GNS-530 is, however, a very short-term solution to
the E-2C navigation RNP shortfall.

The GNS-530 is not

integrated into the E-2’s navigation data bus, which
negates all of its desirable characteristics with regard to
weapon system augmentation.

Additionally, the GNS-530 is

only a standard precision receiver.

It is not suitable for

GPS jammed environments or for combat operations where
selective availability could once again introduce
significant navigational errors.
Future proposed components of the E-2C navigation
system must be fully integrated with the aircraft’s weapon
systems.

To meet the requirements of RNP, the next

generation GPS receiver should be an all-in-view receiver
with integrity monitoring capability.

An all-in-view GPS

receiver has the ability to receive signals from all
satellites above the horizon, usually 8 to 10 satellites,
to determination position.

These requirements must be

clearly stated within the functional requirements documents

19

(FRD) during the requirements determination phase of the
acquisition process.

20

CHAPTER 3:

APPLICABILITY OF AVIATION REGULATIONS

Instrument Flight Rules and GPS
Federal regulations are specific about the use of GPS
in IMC conditions.

The GPS must be approved by the FAA

according to the standards, or some equivalence, outlined
in TSO-129a.

Depending on configuration, the installation

must be completed in accordance with Advisory Circular
AC20-138, AC20-130A or an equivalent. The aircraft must
also have an alternate means of navigation, should the GPS
system fail.

Future E-2 navigation equipment should be

acquired with these requirements in mind.
Applicability to State Aircraft
The aforementioned requirements pertain only to civil
aircraft.

The E-2, however, is a public aircraft or more

specifically, it is a state aircraft.
The definition of a public aircraft is located in
Title 49 United States Code (U.S.C.) § 40102(a)(37).

The

Convention on International Civil Aviation, the
organization credited for forming ICAO, defines any
aircraft engaged in customs, police and military services
as a “state” aircraft.

State aircraft status is not

granted by organization, nor is the US government required
to make a declaration in writing of any such status.
21

There

is no requirement to carry proof of this status.
Correspondingly, the FAA does not certify or attest to the
airworthiness of state aircraft[13].

As such, the E-2C has

never been required to obtain a type certificate (TC) or a
Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) for newly installed
equipment, like the GNS-530.
Compliance Now Applies to State Aircraft
To prevent violation of civil air traffic clearances,
and to ensure safe separation of military and civil air
traffic, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)
has issued policy stating that military aircraft must
conform with civil airspace PNT requirements.

This policy

which defines the acquisition, operation and sustainment of
PNT systems is found in the 2003 CJCS, Master Positioning,
Navigation and Timing Plan [1].
In short, all military aircraft must have appropriate
instruments and navigation equipment that are compatible to
the airspace in which they are to be flown.

Historically,

as with all state aircraft, the E-2 was not required to
conform to civil aviation system standards.

However, now

that non-compliance may compromise safety and access, the
Navy assumes the burden of complying with federal and
international regulations.
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Certification Process
In the United States, certification of civil aircraft
or aircraft systems falls under the purview of the FAA.
The process details how to design, build, test and operate
an aircraft.

One of the instructions governing the process

is “Airworthiness Certification of Aircraft and Related
Products”, Order 8130.2F [14].

FAA certification standards

rely heavily on work by the RTCA.

The basis of GPS

certification standards, as set for by TSO-C129a and
others, refers predominantly to RTCA minimum operational
performance specifications (MOPS) for technical validity.
The Cost of Certification
When discussing the cost of a new system, the fact
that every component of a system must be certified, as well
as the entire system of navigation components, is often
overlooked.

The cost associated with installing a new

component, such as a GPS receiver, includes developing and
testing the new component along with its integration with
currently installed systems.
The process of introducing new operational
capabilities has become more costly for civil aviation
industries, in terms of both time and money.

According to

the “Executive Summary of the Final Report of RTCA Task
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Force 4 Certification”[15], the dynamic growth and
globalization of aviation technology has outpaced the
government’s certification policies and regulatory
oversight.

The cost required to keep pace with improving

technologies has inhibited the introduction of additional
safety enhancements.

Therefore, an acquisition strategy

that capitalizes on previously certified technology
increases the likelihood of economically fielding the
system.
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CHAPTER 4:

HAWKEYE NAVIGATION, THE ROAD AHEAD

Foundations of Future Compliance
To acquire capable navigation systems that are cost
effective and suitable for the E-2 mission, the Navy should
leave the development and integration of all components to
the contractor or manufacturer.

The Navy should only

evaluate the system for the mission and environment in
which it would be operated.

Naval aviation’s acquisition

burden would then be to evaluate the system beyond the
certification requirements.

The scope of developmental and

operational test would be greatly reduced.

To obtain the

right solution the first time, the requirements documents
must clearly capture the appropriate civil document
standards.

A simplified acquisition flow diagram is

located in Figure A-1.
NAVAIR, with the aid of various contractors, plans to
bring an integrated GPS RNP RNAV system into the Hawkeye’s
cockpit.

Those plans include both the E-2C and follow-on

E-2D models.

The exact type of GPS navigation system

solution should result from balancing capability with
available funding.

Lessons learned from previous GPS

evaluations must be applied to these future systems.
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Any future GPS based RNP RNAV solution should take
advantage of industry obtainable FAA certifications.

The

remainder of the self-certification process would include
only highly focused, targeted evaluations with the intent
to answer requirements in the areas of availability,
integrity and containment.
Scope of Previous GPS Testing
The GNS-530 underwent a minimal, yet focused
evaluation period.

Since the GNS-530 is TSO certified,

many of the tests performed on the GNS-530 were unrelated
to RNP RNAV or IMC flight.

A majority of the GNS-530’s

test results that are reviewed below.
The evaluation concentrated on installation, human
machine interface (HMI) and carrier suitability.

In

addition, the performance of the GNS-530 was evaluated for
its ability to provide accurate position information and
guidance during en route, terminal, and non-precision
approaches.

Position accuracy was adequate, and waypoint

sequencing provided the aircrew with proper and timely
visual indications of navigation information and course
guidance.
Bench testing was limited to the communications
system since the GNS-530 has TSO GPS certification.
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The

receiver and transmitter characteristics were evaluated to
verify the manufacturer’s specifications.

Baseline testing

required the construction of a break out box specifically
tailored to isolate the GNS-530 from the aircraft ICS and
to interconnect with our testing equipment.

Test equipment

included, but was not limited to, the use of the IFR 2947,
1840-A Audio Power Meter, as well as the HP54600A
oscilloscope.
Ground testing verified the power on self tests, and
static position satellite reception.

Ground testing also

evaluated the systems compatibility, susceptibility and
vulnerability in various electromagnetic environments.
The in-flight evaluation focused on the GNS-530’s
compatibility with the E-2C Hawkeye’s mission.

One of the

primary compatibility areas of interest was the E-2’s
electromagnetic environment.
when airborne.

It is unique to the aircraft

The aircraft’s structures, specifically the

rotodome antenna, propellers and vertical tails were also
potentially system degraders.

Once it was determined that

there were no problems with signal reception due to
airframe masking, antenna patterns were not recorded.
Lastly, the flight evaluation targeted the operational
suitability of using the communication and navigation
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functions in terminal environments.

A summary of GNS-530

test points are located in Table B-1 and Table B-2.
Lessons Learned from the GNS-530 Evaluation
The GNS-530 was evaluated for SPS L1 GPS signal
reception during static ground test and in-flight dynamic
maneuvering.

The GNS-530 demonstrated excellent signal

reception while its antenna was in full view of orbiting
Space Vehicles (SV).

Dynamic maneuver testing including

360-deg right and left turns at bank angles of 15, 30 and
45 degrees.

Test data revealed that at bank angles of 30

degrees, one or two signal levels were significantly
reduced or lost due to masking by the aircraft’s vertical
tails, rotodome, and legacy GPS antenna fairing.

However,

signal reception remained adequate for accurate navigation
solution.
The GNS-530 receiver was evaluated for electromagnetic
susceptibility and compatibility other onboard E-2C during
all phases of testing.

The GNS-530 satellite status was

observed while each of the ARC-182 UHF/VHF transceivers
were tuned to specific frequencies and transmitted on for
20 seconds.

The frequencies were tested in accordance with

the test as listed in Table B-1 and Table B-2.

No adverse

effects to GPS signal strengths, navigation indications,
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GNS-530 display quality, alerts and warnings, or satellite
DOP were observed.

Transmissions from the E-2 radar and

other avionics systems also indicated no adverse effects or
interference to GPS signal strengths, ADI and BDHI
indications, GNS-530 display quality, alerts and warnings,
or receiver DOP.
Within the cockpit, the distance from a pilot’s or
copilot’s outstretched arm to the GNS-530 controls was
approximately 2 feet.

The placement required the operator

to lean forward against the seat straps, pulling with 20 to
30 pounds of force.

Also, while manipulating the controls,

the operator must look away from all aircraft attitude and
performance reference displays to focus on the
manipulations required to operate the control interface
knobs and buttons.

Entering or modifying a flight plan

required several minutes to perform, distracting the pilot
or copilot from flight duties for an excessive time frame
and increasing pilot fatigue.

The in-flight operation of

the GNS-530 should be delegated to the copilot.
Position data was compared to AN/ARN-151 position data
during all regimes of normal aircraft maneuvering.

During

ground testing and prior to each flight, the Dilution of
Precision (DOP) and Estimated Position Error (EPE) values
29

were observed on the GNS-530. DOP values were less than 1.4
and EPE values were less than 19 feet.

During ground

evaluation, the position difference between the GNS-530 and
the AN/ARN-151 was 18.52 meters.

The maximum in-flight

position difference between the GNS-530 and the AN/ARN-151
was indeterminate.

There were insufficient numbers of data

points collected during test flights to precisely evaluate
the accuracy of the GNS-530’s GPS position.

All data were

hand recorded and resulted in excessive time between
successive data points.

The figure of merit (FOM) of the

AN/ARN-151 drifted from 1, most accurate to 5,
significantly less accurate.

Use of the AN/ARN-151

receiver was not a good "truth data" source since the FOM
was known to vary.
Overall, the performance of the GNS-530 was able to
provide accurate position information and guidance during
en route, terminal, and nonprecision approaches.

Position

accuracy was adequate, and waypoint sequencing provided the
aircrew with proper and timely visual indications of
navigation information and course guidance.

The

performance of the GNS-530, as installed, satisfied FAA
criteria for supplemental navigation use in conjunction
with a sole means navigation system.
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The GNS-530

installation in the E-2C Hawkeye should have been approved
for immediate use a supplemental means of navigation under
visual and instrument flight rules within oceanic en route,
domestic en route and terminal areas.
Future GPS System Evaluations
Specific mission suitability evaluation of GPS
receivers or integrated GPS navigation systems with
capabilities designed for specific military requirements,
such as highly dynamic maneuvering, anti-spoofing and antijamming should be evaluated prior to fielding future
satellite based navigation systems in hostile environments.
Integrated GPS receivers would have to satisfy many more
requirements than the GNS-530 evaluation.

For purposes of

demonstrating RNP RNAV compliance, a PPS receiver should be
evaluated as a SPS receiver with proposed performance
equivalent to a differential GPS.
To date, there has been no formal requirement for an
improved flight control system in the E-2.

With the

exception of heading, attitude and altitude hold, the E-2’s
automated flight control system does not receive steering
cues from the navigation system.

The GNS-530 does not

supply any navigation information to the flight controls.
However, if in future configurations the navigation system
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and flight control system are coupled, an extensive
evaluation would be required.
Just as SPS receivers are required to receive the L1
signal and C/A code, optimum PPS GPS receiver based
navigation solutions should be capability of receiving and
exploiting all available civil GNSS signals.
include the L2 and L5 signals.

This would

In addition, the receiver

should also use signals from the GLONASS and Galileo
satellite navigation systems.

Global operation would imply

selectively choosing optimal signal source.
RNAV evaluation of future satellite-based navigation
systems would, therefore, focus on the following areas:
path estimation, path definition, user interface and system
features and capabilities.

A comprehensive list of tests,

as they apply to these areas, is listed in appendix B.
Table B-3 is a proposed bench test matrix.

Table B-4 is a

proposed ground test matrix and Table B-5 has proposed test
items for a flight evaluation.
in the first column.

Compliance items are listed

The second column contains a

description of the compliance item.

The third column

contains limits for bench test and space for assessment
comments for the ground and flight tests.
is contained in Table B-6.
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A HMI checklist

Lessons learned from previous evaluations illustrate
that; above all else, the pilot and copilot have a clear
and unobstructed view of all displayed data when in the
seated position.

Also, the displays used for maneuver

anticipation and for failure annunciation must be located
within the pilot's primary field of view.

The brilliance

of any display must be adjustable to levels suitable for
data interpretation under all cockpit ambient light
conditions ranging from total darkness to reflected
sunlight.

The approach mode annunciation and distance to

waypoint in the approach mode must be clearly visible to
the pilot with the least practicable deviation from his
normal position and from his line of vision when he is
looking forward along the fight path.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Every acquisition strategy places the mission
capability of a system as the first priority.

For the

mission of global navigation, naval aircraft must have the
capability to meet the applicable civil requirements.
Based on previous system evaluations and current regulatory
recommendations, the following recommendations apply to all
future navigation system programs.
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All future navigation solutions should state within
their respective specification documents, the highest level
civil certification attained.

The test and evaluation

process should honor the level of certification and not
retest to that level.
For systems lacking certification, the author
recommends using the compliance items listed in Table B-3
through Table B-5.

Compliance with these items, in

addition to those required for mission suitability, would
ensure a reliable navigation capability in all
environments.
When accuracy validation is required, a highly
reliable “truth data” source is imperative.

Only the most

sensitive test ranges for fly-over data or an independent,
onboard installation with precise calibration would be
suitable.
Future navigation solutions should be hybrid
navigation systems capable of exploiting all available
satellite systems and all satellites in view.

This would

include having the capability to exploit differential GPS
technology with integrity monitoring when the service is
available.

When not available, the systems should be able

to switch to military precision service with augmentation
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where needed.

Satellite based augmentation is not required

for PPS, however there may be a need such for capability
near military landing facilities.

For navigational

purposes, correctly coded PPS receivers have the
performance equivalence of highly augmented civil,
commercial of the shelf receivers.
Reuse of technology and components is always desired;
however, the question remains whether or not a current
system can, with modification, fulfill future emergent
environmental or mission requirements.

The ultimate goal

is compliance using current or new technology without
duplicating cost and effort through developmental and
operational test.
Future acquisition strategies should acquire new GPS
navigation technologies that meet or exceed the minimum
civil requirements.

Military PPS receivers should have the

same integrity monitoring, alerting and assurances
technology SPS receivers possess now.

In the interim,

current technologies, such as the GNS-530, should be
quickly self-certified and put into operational use.

The

E-2C Hawkeye will then be assured of having accurate, selfcontained, all-weather access to any foreign environment,
with safe separation from all aircraft.
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Figure A-1:
Flow Diagram of Compliance Strategy
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APPENDIX B
TABLES
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Table B-1: Garmin Ground Test Summary
Test

Remarks

Pass-Fail Criteria

Verify Jeppesen data base
currency

Check database currency following power on.

Jeppesen database is loaded and
currency is within 28 days.

Crosscheck instrument
panel self-test on the
Garmin.

Crosscheck ADI CDI and BDHI with test page.

Record ADI and BDHI indications
during self-test.
No warning flag displayed.

GPS signal reception and
integrity check.

Verify no. of satellites acquired on
satellite page.

Verify a sufficient no. of
satellites are acquired to provide
GPS 3D navigation. Integrity light
remains extinguished.

Verify accuracy of GPS
position data.

Crosscheck Garmin derived GPS position with
ARN-151 position.

Garmin GPS position data should
agree with current aircraft
position data.

EMC compatibility &
Susceptibility of GPS
with all VHF radios.

Conduct VHF Comm. on 121.15, 121.175,
121.200, 131.250, 131.275 and 131.300 MHz.
Note affects on satellite page.

GPS satellite reception is not
affected by VHF transmissions.

Loss of power/signal to
GPS receiver and external
displays.

Simulate a loss of signal to the GPS and
loss of power to the associated displays.

Annunciator indications provide
proper warnings for unreliable GPS
signal and warning flags are
displayed on external displays.
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Table B-2: Garmin Flight Test Summary
Test

Remarks

EMC compatibility &
Susceptibility of GPS with
all VHF radios (Comm
1/2/5), E-2C Radar, &
other avionics systems.

Conduct VHF Comm. on 121.15, 121.175,
121.200, 131.250, 131.275 and 131.300 MHz.
Operate the E-2C Radar.

GPS satellite reception is not
affected by VHF, RADAR, or other
Avionics transmissions.

Verify accuracy of GPS
position data.

Cross check Garmin derived GPS position
against ARN-151 position.

During level and maneuvering
flight the Garmin GPS position
data should agree with aircraft
derived position.

Create a flight plan and activate. Modify
flight plan, and perform direct-to
function. HMI. Workload.

Operator was able to modify
existing plan and perform a direct
to function from an active flight
plan.

Airframe masking: GPS nav mode selected,
monitor integrity indicator and satellite
data for uninterrupted coverage.

GPS integrity is not affected.
Satisfactory satellite coverage
during holding pattern, 360 deg
turns both right/left at 15, 30, &
45 deg AOB.

Evaluate GNS-530
capability to create,
activate, and modify an
existing GPS flight plan.
Functionality.
Verify nav data during
normal aircraft maneuvers
and 360 turns at AOB = 15,
30, & 45 deg

GPS non-precision
approaches

Pass-Fail Criteria

Fly multiple approaches and transitions
from enroute to terminal to approach using
the nav data base. Monitor display
sensitivities, annunciations, waypoint
sequencing. VMC only.
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Cross check GPS guidance against
TACAN approach information. GPS
provided correct guidance to
execute satisfactory approaches to
perform a normal landing at
airfield.

Table B-3: Proposed Non-certified GPS Bench Test
Compliance Item

Remarks

Limits/Requirements

Note signals from which the receiver is
able to derive positions and RNAV
information under interference conditions.
GPS-provided iono correction model
Tropospheric corrections are applied.
Data decoded continuously.
Clock and ephemeris parameters used after
they have been successfully collected twice
Iono data is used after is has been
successfully collected twice.
Satellite clock corrections, include
relativistic corrections, are applied to
pseudorange after smoothing (if applicable)
GPS satellites are not mistaken due to
cross-correlation during acquisition or
reacquisition
DO-229C 2.5.1 Table 2-19

IF or RF receiver capable of
receiving L1, L2, or L5.
Potential reception of GLONASS and
Galileo.
System selects and uses iono
models. System correctly applies
Tropo corrections. Downlink data
is decoded continuously
System validates ephemeris before
use. System validates iono data
before use. System correctly
applies satellite clock info
System protects against crosscorrelation.

Initial Acquisition
Time

System acquires satellites and determines
position without initialization
information.
DO-229C 2.5.1 Table 2-19

TTFF ≤ 5 minutes, given;
initialization of LAT/LONG within
60 nm., TIME/DATE within
1 minute, valid almanac, and
unobstructed satellite visibility;
under the specified interference
conditions

GPS Satellite Acquisition
Time

During steady state operation satellites
are acquired and incorporated into position
solution
DO-229C 2.5.1 Table 2-19

Incorporated within 80 seconds

Satellite visibility,
selection and atmospheric
compensation
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Table B-3: Continued
Compliance Item
Satellite
Reacquisition Time

Satellite Tracking

Dynamic Tracking

Remarks

Limits/Requirements

Reacquires satellite and computes pseudorange within 10 seconds when the remaining
satellites provide a GDOP of 6 or less
(from point when signal is available after
a loss interval up to 30 seconds)
DO-229C 2.5.1 Table 2-19

Reacquire and use in position
solution within 10 seconds.

System capable of tracking a minimum of
8 satellites

Shown to track 8 satellites
simultaneously.

Equipment maintains accuracy during
representative en route and terminal area
maneuvering

System maintains accuracy during
normal dynamics under the
specified signal power and
interference conditions. Abnormal
maneuvers do not cause misleading
information. Re-acquisitions are
performed, as specified, when the
abnormal maneuvers complete.
Proper indication of loss of
navigation and loss of integrity
is shown during abnormal
maneuvers.

System interoperable with a standard
antenna
Sensitivity and
Dynamic Range

or

Tracks satellites at -136 dBm

Manufacturer-provided-antenna satisfies
performance of RTCA/DO-228.
DO-229C 2.5.1 Table 2-19
Equipment Burnout
Protection

System withstands in-band CWI @ +20 dBm at
the antenna without damage
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No damage in-band CWI @ +20 dBm

Table B-3: Continued
Compliance Item

Remarks

Limits/Requirements

DO-229C 2.5.1 Table 2-19

Navigation Alert

Notification is indicated of loss of
navigation indication within 1 second
following:
a) Loss of power
b) System malfunctions
c) If for 5 seconds insufficient number of
satellites for position solution.
DO-229C 2.5.1 Table 2-19

Alert visible given during given
circumstances within 1 second

En Route and Terminal Navigation Requirements

Accuracy

Requirement met under the minimum signal
conditions defined in DO-229C 2.1.1.10 and
interference conditions defined in
Appendix C.

Integrity

The hardware and software shall be designed
such that the output of misleading
information, considered to be a major
failure condition, shall be improbable.
Conduct a safety assessment to evaluate the
system's implementation against known
failure conditions.

Satellite Tracking

Track a minimum of 8 satellites
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Horizontal radial position fixing
error ≤ 100 m, 95th percentile,
when HDOP is normalized to
1.5.
Hardware: show that failures of
the equipment that result in
misleading information are not
-5
more probable than 10 /flight
hour.
Software: See AC 20-115B, which
references RTCA/DO-178B

Table B-3: Continued
Compliance Item

Remarks

Limits/Requirements

Dynamic Tracking

Meet en route accuracy requirements during
maneuvering flight. During maneuvers,
equipment shall not output misleading
information. When the aircraft returns to
normal maneuvers from abnormal maneuvers,
the equipment shall meet the steady-state
reacquisition requirements of:
DO-229C Section 2.1.1.9.

Ground Speed:
Horizontal Accel:
Vertical Accel:

Position Output

Position shall represent the WGS-84
position of the aircraft antenna (or center
of navigation) at the time of
applicability. The equipment shall provide
an electronic data interface capable of
transmitting digital data containing
position, velocity, integrity and other
pertinent data.
DO-229C 2.1.2.6

Output based on WGS-84 model

Position Output Update
Rate

Minimum update rate of position outputs
used for navigation

Position outputs once per second

Position Output Latency

The interval between the time of the
measurement and the time of applicability
of the position
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Latency ≤ 500 msec

500 kts
+2.7, -0.6g
+3.2, -1.0g

Table B-3: Continued
Compliance Item

Remarks

Limits/Requirements

En Route and Terminal Integrity Monitoring
FDE algorithm sets:
(1)SA mode, if any satellite URA's
are greater than 16 meters
(2)SA off mode, if the URA for
every satellite being used is less
than or equal to 16 meters

FDE - Provided
Integrity
Monitoring

System has autonomous FDE capability:
FDE uses URA broadcast to modify modes
DO-229C 2.5.1 Table 2-19

Time to Alert

Time to alert 8 seconds
DO-229C 2.5.1 Table 2-19

Missed Alert
Probability

Analysis validates documentation and tests
prove systems missed alert probability
≤ 0.001.

False Alert
Probability

Probability of false alert ≤ 10-5/hour.
Average duration and probability of a false
-7
alert will be < 3.33x10 .

Failed Exclusion
Probability

Validate documentation. Test proves
system’s failed exclusion probability
≤ 10-3/hour.

Probability of failed exclusion ≤
-3
10 /hour

Availability

Analysis validation proves availability of
detection ≥ 99.9 % and availability of
exclusion ≥ 98.0 %

Availability of detection ≥ 99.9%
Availability of exclusion ≥ 98.0%

System displays alert within TTA
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Probability of missed alert
≤ 0.001

Probability of false alert ≤ 105/hour. Average duration and

probability of a false alert will
be < 3.33x10-7

Table B-3: Continued
Compliance Item

Remarks

Limits/Requirements

Nonprecision Approach Requirements

Accuracy

Requirement met under the minimum signal
conditions defined in DO-229C 2.1.1.10 and
interference conditions defined in
Appendix C.

Integrity

The hardware and software shall be designed
such that the output of misleading
information, considered to be a major
failure condition, shall be improbable.
Conduct a safety assessment to evaluate the
system's implementation against known
failure conditions

Horizontal radial position fixing
error ≤ 100 m, 95th percentile,
when HDOP is normalized to
1.5
Hardware: show that failures of
the equipment that result in
misleading information are not
more probable than 10-5/flight
hour.
Software: See AC 20-115B, which
references RTCA/DO-178B

Satellite Tracking

Track all satellites in view, with mask
angle greater than 5 degrees

Track a minimum of 8 satellites

Dynamic Tracking

Meet en route accuracy requirements during
maneuvering flight. During maneuvers,
equipment shall not output misleading
information. When the aircraft returns to
normal maneuvers from abnormal maneuvers,
the equipment shall meet the steady-state
reacquisition requirements of:
DO-229C Section 2.1.1.9

Ground Speed:
Horizontal Accel:
Vertical Accel:

Position Output

Position shall represent the WGS-84
position of the aircraft antenna (or center
of navigation) at the time of
applicability. The equipment shall provide
an electronic data interface capable of
transmitting digital data containing
position, velocity, integrity and other

Output based on WGS-84 model
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500 kts
+2.7, -0.6g
+3.2, -1.0g

Table B-3: Continued
Compliance Item

Remarks

Limits/Requirements

pertinent data.
DO-229C 2.1.2.6
Position Output Update
Rate
Position Output Latency

Minimum update rate of position outputs
used for navigation

Position outputs once per second

The interval between the time of the
measurement and the time of applicability
of the position

Latency ≤ 500 msec

Nonprecision Approach Integrity Monitoring

FDE - Provided
Integrity
Monitoring

System has autonomous FDE capability:
FDE uses URA broadcast to modify modes
DO-229C 2.5.1 Table 2-19

Time to Alert

Time to alert 8 seconds
DO-229C 2.5.1 Table 2-19

Missed Alert
Probability

Analysis validates documentation and tests
prove systems missed alert probability
≤ 0.001.

False Alert
Probability

Probability of false alert ≤ 10-5/hour.
Average duration and probability of a false
-7
alert will be < 3.33x10 .

Failed Exclusion
Probability

Validate documentation. Test proves
system’s failed exclusion probability
≤ 10-3/hour.

FDE algorithm sets:
(1)SA mode, if any satellite URA's
are greater than 16 meters
(2)SA off mode, if the URA for
every satellite being used is less
than or equal to 16 meters
System displays alert within TTA
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Probability of missed alert
≤ 0.001
Probability of false alert ≤ 10-

5/hour. Average duration and

probability of a false alert will
be < 3.33x10-7
Probability of failed exclusion ≤
-3
10 /hour

Table B-3: Continued
Compliance Item

Remarks

Limits/Requirements

Analysis validation proves availability of
detection ≥ 99.9 % and availability of
exclusion ≥ 98.0 %

Availability of detection ≥ 99.9%
Availability of exclusion ≥ 98.0%

Present Position

Assess alphanumeric latitude and longitude
display of aircrafts present position
DO-283 2.2.1.1

Display resolution of 0.1 minutes
or better

Estimate of Position
Uncertainty

Assess display of Estimated Position
Uncertainty. Note system notifications if
integrity limit is exceeded
DO-283 2.2.1.2

Display resolution of 0.1 nm or
better

Containment Radius

Verify true position falls within estimated
position containment radius
DO-283 2.2.1.3

Availability
Position Estimation

Position Initialization

Navigation Aid Selection

Probability of true position
falling outside containment radius
shall be less than

10-5/hour

If manual system initialization is
available, verify resolution
DO-283 2.2.1.4

Position entry resolution of 0.1
minute or better

If the system has the option to choose
between GPS and INS, navigation operations
should not be affected during the transfer
DO-283 2.2.1.5

Note alerts and annunciations
during or following changes in
navigation emitter source

Verify system provision of the following
leg types: Course-to-Fix(CF), Direct-to-

Leg types present

Path Definition
Leg Types
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Table B-3: Continued
Compliance Item

Remarks

Limits/Requirements

Fix(DF), Initial Fix(IF), Radius-toFix(RF), Track-to-Fix (TF)
DO-283 2.2.2.1

Flight Planning

Assess the capability to insert, delete
waypoints into active and inactive flight
plans. Assess ease of entering/activating
a flight plan. Assess the ease of appending
or removing SID/STAR/Approach procedure
DO-283 2.2.2.2

Comment on ease and intuitiveness
of each operation

Cross-Track Deviation
Display

Verify the display and electrical output of
cross track deviation while varying RNP
Type, aircraft position, desired track, fix
geometry and leg type
DO-283 2.2.4.1

Great circle distance from the
present position to the closest
point on the active leg of the
course. ±20 nm. Minimum resolution
of 0.01 nm for distances less than
1 nm. 0.1 for distances less than
9.9 nm and 1.0 nm beyond.

Verify distance display to active fix, next
fix or destination has the resolution of
0.1 nm or better. The distance display
should accommodate a distance display of at
least 9999 nm.
DO-283 2.2.4.2

Resolution ≤ 0.1 nm
Distance displayed ≥ 9999 nm

Verify TO-FROM indication is continuously
displayed whenever a waypoint is selected.
DO-283 2.2.4.3

Presence of TO-FROM indication.
Matches actual position relative
to waypoint

Feedback shall be supplied during data
entry, with confirmation of input action
prior to activation based upon that input.
Any equipment prompts must be easily
understood.

Confirmation of input supplied.
Assess the ease of waypoint entry.

Waypoint Distance Display

TO-FROM Indication

Waypoint Entry
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Table B-3: Continued
Compliance Item

Remarks

Limits/Requirements

Equipment shall automatically sequence
waypoints in the active flight plan. If
automatic sequencing is suspended for any
reason, the equipment shall retain the
active flight plan for later selection.
If the equipment provides the capability to
suspend and unsuspend automatic sequencing
as a discrete action (SUSP), the equipment
shall continuously annunciate when waypoint
sequencing has been suspended. If the
pilot deselects SUSP mode, automatic
sequencing of waypoints shall resume upon
reaching the current waypoint if the
current waypoint is in the flight plan.
DO-229C 2.2.1.2.4

Waypoint within active flight plan
sequence automatically as aircraft
progresses along flight planned
path. Pilot is able to suspend
and unsuspend waypoint sequencing.

Display all positions of latitude and
longitude with a minimum resolution of 0.01
min or better.
DO-283 2.2.4.6

Position resolution ≤ 0.01 min

DO-229C 3.3.1.2.2

Waypoint or Leg Sequencing

Position Display

Failure/Status
Indication

Failures or loss of signal shall be
output/displayed within one second of the
onset of any of the following conditions:
a. Loss of power (loss of function is an
acceptable indicator);
b. Equipment malfunction or failure
c. A condition lasting five seconds or more
where there are an inadequate number of
satellites to compute a position solution;
d. Fault detection detects a position
failure, which cannot be excluded within
the time-to-alert.
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Fault indication: ≤ 1 second
Time-to-Alert
Oceanic/Remote: 1 minute
En Route: 30 seconds
Terminal: 10 seconds

Table B-3: Continued
Compliance Item

Remarks

Limits/Requirements

DO-229C 2.2.2.6.3

Equipment Computational
Response Time

Measure display latency, display update
rates, and time to provide flight guidance
during nominal and heavy processing
conditions. The test objective is to verify
that response times are meet under both
normal and high usage conditions.
DO-229C 2.5.11.1.3
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Display latency: ≤ 1 second
Display update rate:
en route
≤ 1 Hz
terminal mode ≤ 1 Hz
Course guidance: 5 seconds
Time between accepting changes to
active flight plan and outputting
navigation guidance: ≤ 5 seconds

Table B-4: Proposed Non-certified GPS Ground Test
Compliance Item

Remarks

Equipment Operation
Limitations

Equipment operation limitations that
consider sensor availability and
navigational aid coverage should be
contained in the aircraft flight manual and
clearly identified in the
aircraft cockpit by means of placards.

Conformity Inspection

Visually inspect the installed equipment to
determine the use of acceptable workmanship
and engineering practices.
Ref. DO-229 3.1.4.1.1

Antenna Installation

GPS antenna should be separated as far as
possible from other antennas (e.g.,
UHF/VHF, SATCOM, and HF) and the windscreen
(to prevent case-to antenna coupling)
Ref. DO-229 3.1.1.2

Cockpit Layout of
Installed Equipment

Accessibility

Evaluate the cockpit layout of the
installed equipment with emphasis on
equipment controls, applicable circuit
breakers (labels and accessibility), power
switching arrangement, and related
indicators, displays, annunciators, etc.
Ref. DO-229 3.3.1.3.1.1
Accessing controls do not contribute to
discomfort or fatigue. Controls installed
for in-flight operation shall be readily
accessible from the pilot's seated
position. Only single-hand operation
should be required, the controls should be
readily identifiable. Use of the controls
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Assessment

Table B-4: Continued
Compliance Item

Remarks
should not obscure pertinent displays.
Particular attention should be given to
other "L" band equipment, such as
TCAS or SATCOM equipment; VHF transmissions
on the frequencies listed below; high
frequency (HF) communications systems; and
other transmitting equipment (e.g., ACARS,
AFIS, Flightfone, etc.).

Electromagnetic
Compatibility

The following VHF frequencies shall be
evaluated:
121.150 MHz 131.250 MHz
121.175 MHz 131.275 MHz
121.200 MHz 131.300 MHz
DO-229 3.1.4.1.4

Display Visibility

Assess display visibility of the controls,
displays, and annunciators from pilot and
copilot design eye point of view
DO-229 3.3.1.1.1

Interference Effects

Shall be no navigation or display
degradation from E-2 avionics systems.
Equipment shall not be installed in such a
manner as to be the source of objectionable
conducted or radiated interference.

Inadvertent Turnoff

Minimum risks of unwanted system turn off.

Accuracy Test

DO-229 3.3.1.3.1.2
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Assessment

Table B-4: Continued
Compliance Item

Remarks

Crew Workload

Rate workload for performing routine
functions such as entering and activating
flight plan, SID, STAR, flight plan change,
user waypoint definition.
Ref. DO-229 3.3.1.3.2.6

System Operational
Integrity

System degradation below the minimum
acceptable performance required for phase
of flight shall be clearly annunciated in
the cockpit, and the visual indication of
such degradation shall be prominently
displayed within the primary field of view
of the pilot.

Switching and Transfer
Functions

System display and navigation solution
shall not be degraded by electrical bus
switching transients less than 1.6 second
in duration.
Ref. DO-229 3.3.1.3.2.1

Failure
Modes/Annunciations
Readiness

All equipment failure annunciators should
be tested during preflight to verify proper
operation.
Ref. DO-229 3.3.1.3.2.2
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Assessment

Table B-5: Proposed Non-Certified GPS Flight Test
Compliance Item

Remarks
Particular attention should be given to
other "L" band equipment, such as
TCAS or SATCOM equipment; UHF/VHF
transmissions on the frequencies listed
below; high frequency (HF) communications
systems; and especially the E-2 Radar
system.

EMC compatibility &
Susceptibility of GPS with
all VHF radios (Comm
1/2/6), E-2C Radar, &
other avionics systems.

The following VHF frequencies shall be
evaluated:
121.150 MHz 131.250 MHz
121.175 MHz 131.275 MHz
121.200 MHz 131.300 MHz
The following UHF frequencies shall be
evaluated:
225.125 MHz 325.125 MHz
269.125 MHz 369.125 MHz
299.125 MHz 390.125 MHz
DO-229 3.1.4.1.4

Switching and Transfer
Functions

System display and navigation solution
shall not be degraded by electrical bus
switching transients less than 1.6 second
in duration.
Ref. DO-229 3.3.1.3.2.1

Failure Modes and
Annunciations

Review, and verify where appropriate
through demonstration, various failure
modes and associated annunciations, such as
loss of electrical power, loss of signal
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Assessment

Table B-5: Continued
Compliance Item

Remarks
reception or GPS equipment failure. Verify
that a warning associated with loss of
navigation is accompanied by a visible
indication within the pilot's normal field
of view. Verify that audible alarms are
sufficiently loud and of appropriate pitch
quality, duration, and pattern. Verify that
alarms are easily deactivated (but not
easily deactivated inadvertently).
DO-229C 3.3.1.3.2.2

Display Visibility

Assess display visibility of the controls,
displays, and annunciators from pilot and
copilot design eye point of view
DO-229 3.3.1.1.1

Controls and Display
Readability

Assess readability in total darkness to
bright sunlight (to include indirect,
reflected ambient conditions). No
distracting cockpit glare or reflections
may be introduced by the GPS/WAAS equipment
and all controls must be illuminated for
identification and ease of use. Colors,
small symbols, and small alpha-numerics
must be clearly distinguishable, brightness
of (non-adjustable) annunciators must be
acceptable, and brightness and contrast
adjustments must be acceptable. Characters
embedded in text must be distinguishable.
Night lighting shall be consistent with
other cockpit lighting.
DO-283 2.1.7.2

Control/Display Capability

Assess data input/output:
Operable with one hand:
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Assessment

Table B-5: Continued
Compliance Item

Remarks
Assess page labeling:
Note page continuation identifiers:
DO-229 3.3.1.1.2
DO-283 2.1.7.1

Controls Accessibility,
Usability

Evaluate the accessibility and usability of
all controls pertaining to GPS. Verify that
data entry procedures are in conformance
with the requirements of Sections 2.2.1.2
and 3.3.1.2.2

Displayed GPS Navigation
Parameters

Evaluate displayed GPS navigation
parameters on interface cockpit instruments
such as HSI, CDI, distance display,
electronic flight instruments system
(EFIS), moving maps, fuel management
systems, etc. Verify that display minimum
discernible movement accuracy of the
centered display, resolution of the
electrical output, linearity of the display
and/or electrical output, and display
latency are appropriate for the navigation
modes supported.
DO-229C 3.3.1.3.2.4

Continuity of Navigation
Data

Verify continuity of navigation data during
normal aircraft maneuvering for the
navigation modes to be validated.
RO-229C 3.3.1.3.2.7

Direct-To Function

Verify that execution of an aircraft
heading change to intercept a direct leg
does not cause "S" turns.
DO-229C 3.3.2.3.2.6
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Assessment

Table B-5: Continued
Compliance Item

Remarks

Fly-By Turn Performance

Conduct several fly-by turns. Verify that
the equipment accomplishes the turn as a
fly-by waypoint and discourages overshoot.
DO-229C 3.3.1.3.2.8

Cross-Track Deviation
Display

For installations where GPS outputs can
drive a display that is shared in common
with other navigation equipment (e.g.,
TACAN, VOR/DME, ILS) the annunciation of
the system in use shall be clearly
indicated. Deviation from the desired track
shall be displayed to the range and
resolution requirements. Demonstrate
minimum discernible movement, accuracy of
the centered display, resolution of the
electrical output, linearity of the display
and/or electrical output, and display
latency.
DO-229C 3.3.1.2.1

Evaluate work load
requited to create,
activate, or modify GPS
flight plans.

Rate workload for performing routine
functions such as entering and activating
flight plan, SID, STAR, flight plan change,
user waypoint definition.
DO-229C 3.3.1.3.2.6

Verify nav data during
normal aircraft maneuvers
and 360 turns at AOB = 15,
30, & 45 deg

Airframe masking: GPS nav mode selected,
monitor integrity indicator and satellite
data for uninterrupted coverage.

GPS non-precision
approaches

Fly multiple approaches and transitions
from enroute to terminal to approach using
the nav data base. Monitor display
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Assessment

Table B-5: Continued
Compliance Item

Remarks
sensitivities, annunciations, waypoint
sequencing. VMC only. Cross check GPS
guidance against TACAN/VOR or INS
information.
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Assessment

Table B-6: Component Human Machine Interface Checklist
Operator Activity

Assessment (Pass/Fail/Comments)

Quantify force required to activate knobs/buttons.
Quantify risk of inadvertent activation or deactivation based
on control operation feedback
Verify single-hand operations, controls identifiable, use does
not obscure displays.
Controls logically arranged according to functional groups,
sequence of use, and frequency of use.
Quantify chance of error, easy of error recovery, overall
usability.
Evaluate knob shape/size does not interfere with use,
distinguishable, aids in pilots use.
Evaluate label construction: discernible and readable on
equipment.
Evaluate label placement: display is unobstructed by use.
Evaluate Terminology: Labels describe function of knob,
consistent across equipment, abbreviations conform to
aviation usage.
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